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Abstract
The current study examined the effects of need for inclusion and differentiation (Brewer, 1991)
activations on endorsement of colorblind and multicultural ideologies, and the roles ideological
endorsements played in visual social perception. A total of 238 university students were given
false feedback on a personality inventory to activate needs for differentiation and inclusion, as
well as completed interethnic ideology measures and a morphed-faces judgment task in which
they perceived whether paired others were exactly the same or different. Bootstrapping analyses
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008) confirmed that, consistent with hypotheses, need for inclusion
activation participants endorsed colorblind ideology to a greater extent, as well as took longer to
correctly identify ambiguously different faces, compared to need for differentiation activation
participants. Moreover, colorblind ideology endorsement predicted increased reaction time in
correctly categorizing ambiguously different faces. Analyses indicated that colorblind ideology
fully mediated the need state activation-reaction time to correctly categorize ambiguously
different faces relationship. Need state activation condition did not predict multicultural ideology
endorsement, nor did multicultural ideology endorsement predict reaction time to correctly
categorize ambiguously different faces. Results reveal that inclusiveness need activation may
predispose one to endorse colorblind ideology, which in turn holds basic social perception
implications within ambiguous contexts.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
By 2050, census projections indicate that Hispanics, Blacks, and individuals of other
races/ethnicities will make up greater than 50% of the American population (compared to 35.3%
in 2010). As such, an important current and future issue for America’s government, employers,
schools, and other organizations is how to confront increasing diversity, while simultaneously
promoting harmony among United States citizens of different backgrounds and cultures. At least
two major diversity models have been utilized by governments and organizations to address
issues of diversity and promote harmony. One model consists of treating everyone the same, and
minimizing the valuation of ethnic group differences, whereas the other consists of valuing,
respecting, and celebrating ethnic group differences. The primary goal of this study is to identify
the motivational antecedents of these two interethnic ideologies.
Colorblind and Multicultural Ideology
Colorblind ideology, entrenched in American ideals of individualism (Triandis, 1995), is
the set of beliefs that individuals should all be ‘treated the same’ and that group differences
should be ignored. Since the early 1960’s when segregation was deemed illegal, colorblind
ideological approaches have dominated diversity models of America’s organizational,
educational, and legal institutions (Plaut, 2002). Embedded in this ideological approach is that
basic features such as race are immediately perceived and used to categorize others, but that such
differences are superficial, trivial, and should be ignored by perceivers. Indeed, much empirical
research has demonstrated the often adverse implications, such as stereotyping (e.g., Devine,
1989), prejudicial attitudes (e.g., Fazio & Dunton, 1997), and social inference (e.g., Gilbert,
1989) that stem from automatic perception of category differences that advance rigid ingroupoutgroup distinctions (see Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002, for a review). As such, Brewer and
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Miller (1984) developed a decategorization approach to the perception of category-based
distinctions, in which they posited that category salience of minority and majority group
members should be reduced to a minimum in order to extinguish the negative implications of
automatic categorization. Colorblind ideology is largely entrenched in this approach, and defined
by the beliefs that ‘treating everyone the same’ and breaking down categorical distinctions will
subsequently promote equal group treatment and intergroup harmony.
In comparison, multicultural ideology is the set of beliefs that group differences should
be acknowledged, respected, and valued, and that valuing minorities’ ethnic identities is
important to the well-being of minority members and ultimately, improving intergroup relations.
Diversity models entrenched in multicultural ideology emphasize that only when ethnic
minorities feel their identities are safe and valued can they contribute to interethnic interactions
in a way that will promote intergroup harmony and other positive outcomes (see Plaut, 2002 for
a review). Inherent in this ideological approach is that categorization of individuals based on
racial differences is inevitable (Brewer & Miller, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), and thus ethnic
differences must be acknowledged, accepted and valued. For example, Fiske and Neuberg’s
(1990) continuum model of impression formation posits that upon perception of an individual,
one automatically categorizes that individual to ‘privileged’ social categories, which include
race, age, and gender. The model contends that unless one has the motivation to move beyond
the initial category impression facilitated by these ‘privileged features,’ as well as other physical
features, (e.g., weight) and behavioral features (e.g., smiling), it is very likely that the impression
one forms of an individual will be based on initial category-based designations. Accordingly,
multicultural ideology is defined by the beliefs that perceptions of ethnic group differences are
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inevitable, and should thus be acknowledged, respected, and valued so that intergroup harmony
and racial tolerance may be achieved.
Endorsements of colorblind and multicultural ideologies have been associated with
important interpersonal and intergroup outcomes, such as stereotype reliance (Wolsko, Park,
Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000), prejudice toward minority group members (Richeson & Nussbaum,
2004), and self-esteem (Verkuyten, 2009). For instance, among White participants, Wolsko et al.
(2000) found that a multicultural ideology-based message caused stronger perception of group
stereotypes than did a colorblind ideology-based message. Richeson and Nussbaum (2004), in a
study of how colorblind and multicultural ideology messages affected implicit and explicit racial
bias against Blacks (relative to Whites), found that relative to a multicultural message, a
colorblind message led to greater implicit and explicit racial bias. These findings suggest that
relative to colorblind ideology endorsement, multicultural ideology endorsement may lead to
greater stereotype reliance, but reduced prejudice. Research has also evaluated important selfbased outcomes of interethnic ideology endorsement. For instance, across two studies, Verkuyten
(2009) found that multicultural ideology endorsement predicted self-esteem among ethnic
minority members, but not majority group members. Thus, it appears clear that colorblind and
multicultural ideologies have important implications for prejudice and intergroup contact.
Antecedents of Interethnic Ideology Endorsements
Whereas a common practice in the lab has been to manipulate or measure one’s
endorsement of colorblind and multicultural ideology and investigate their effects, less common
has been the investigation of situation- or motivation-based factors that may predispose one
toward an orientation of colorblind or multicultural ideology. To my knowledge, although the
outcomes associated with colorblind and multicultural ideology endorsement have been
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investigated, only two studies have investigated the origins of these ideologies (see Knowles,
Lowery, Chow, & Hogan, 2009; Plaut, Garnett, Bufardi, & Sanchez-Burks, 2011). Indeed, Ryan,
Casas, and Thompson (2010) proposed that ‘one goal of intergroup relations researchers should
be to focus on the antecedents and consequences of particular ideologies or combinations of
ideologies and the ways that they are used to affect social change’ (p. 41). Although the
‘consequences’ of particular ideologies have been investigated, an understanding of the
antecedents that may predispose one to endorse colorblind or multicultural ideology is lacking.
In the first study to evaluate the antecedents of colorblind and multicultural ideology
endorsements, Knowles et al. (2009) demonstrated that manipulations of intergroup threat caused
Whites high in anti-egalitarianism sentiment (as measured by SDO) to more strongly endorse
colorblind ideology. However, this study evaluated only how colorblind ideology endorsement
was predicted by Whites’ anti-egalitarianism sentiment and did not simultaneously investigate
individual difference-based antecedents of multicultural ideology.
Recently, Plaut et al. (2011) investigated the associations between feelings of exclusion
and inclusion with multicultural and colorblind ideologies, the self, and support for diversity
initiatives among White and minority individuals. They found that multiculturalism was
implicitly associated with feelings of exclusion for Whites. Furthermore, averaging across
participants, the authors found that perceiving multiculturalism as inclusive to the self in a selfassociation matching task, as well as feeling more inclusive in organizational diversity
initiatives, were positively associated with support for diversity. Finally, the authors found that
individuals high in the need to belong rated an organization conveying a multicultural message
as less attractive than an organization conveying a colorblind message. These findings suggest
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that a strong endorsement of colorblind ideology may be especially likely among individuals
high in a need for inclusion.
Inclusion and Differentiation Motives
Indeed, an abundant amount of psychological research has documented the importance of
inclusion with others, or belongingness, as a basic human motive (Baumeister & Leary, 1995;
Fiske, 2004; Maslow, 1943; McAdams, 1982; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980; Vignoles,
Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000). Over the last few decades, an increasing amount of social
psychological research has either directly or indirectly examined the functionality of the
affiliative motive from an evolutionary perspective (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Kenrick,
Neuberg, Griskevicius, Becker, & Schaller, 2010; Leary, 2010). More specifically, this research
has examined how a need for affiliation with others, may have been evolutionarily adaptive in
promoting survival and well-being. For instance, empirical evidence indicates that modern
human ancestors of hunter-gather societies lived for the most part in groups (Ainsworth, 1989;
Lancaster, 1976), and that this affiliation had adaptive survival benefits, such as sharing of
resources, knowledge, and greater likelihood of reproduction, parenting, and protection (Henrich
& Boyd, 1998; Kameda & Tindale, 2006; Leary, 2010).
In addition to survival benefits, evidence indicates that affiliation with others is directly
associated with important health and emotional outcomes (see Myers, 2000). For instance,
individuals with more social ties are less susceptible to ill health and premature death (Cohen,
1988; House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988). Furthermore, individuals with more close
relationships appear to be happier, on average, than those with less close relationships (Pavot,
Diener, & Fujita, 1990). The evidence suggests that affiliation with others was evolutionarily
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adaptive for the survival of modern human ancestors, and that affiliation with others is functional
in promoting individual well-being.
On the other hand, however, there appears to also be evolutionary adaptive benefits in
restricting, or limiting affiliation with others (Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg, & Schaller, 2010).
For instance, Kenrick et al. (2010) discuss how isolation from others may have been
evolutionarily adaptive in avoiding costs such as competition over local resources, socially
transmitted diseases, and exploitation by other group members. As such, there appears to be
opposing evolutionary adaptive benefits for limiting affiliation to a smaller group of close others.
Indeed, evidence seems to suggest that humans were evolved to live in relatively small, tightlyknit groups (Dunbar, 1992). In this way, our ancestors could affiliate with others to promote
survival advantages, while simultaneously limiting the number of those they affiliated with to
constrain costs such as resource conflict, disease, and exploitation. Together, this work suggests
that affiliation with others, as well as differentiation from others, may be basic, adaptive motives
that served survival needs of our ancestors.
Indeed, the tenet that a sense of inclusion and differentiation from others are basic human
needs has been demonstrated using multiple theoretical frameworks in many disciplines
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fromkin, 1972; McAdams, 1982; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980;
Vignoles et al., 2000). Inclusiveness needs stem from the goal of being similar to valued others,
whereas differentiation needs stem from the goal of being unique from relevant others. The
current view of the field is that although these needs may manifest themselves differently across
cultures (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005), they are
universal, basic human needs (Brewer, 1991). Fulfillment of both needs hold important affective
(Fromkin, 1972; Prager, 1986), cognitive (Markus & Kunda, 1986; McAdams, 1982), and
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behavioral (Duval, 1972; Greenburg & Stone, 1992) implications. Certainly, social bonds with
others and a sense of differentiation from others are chief aspects of individuals’ self-concepts.
Although historically psychologists focused on fulfillment of these needs through persons’
interactions with individuals (e.g., through intimacy building techniques, distinguishing oneself
from others), the prominence of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) stimulated
investigation as to how these motivational needs could be both activated and fulfilled through
individuals’ group memberships.
Brewer’s (1991) optimal distinctiveness theory (ODT) is based in social identity theory,
and attempts to explain the malleability of group memberships as a function of balancing needs
for inclusion and differentiation through social identities. Brewer’s (1991) ODT improves on
other models of belongingness and differentiation needs by highlighting the dual ways through
which needs for inclusion and differentiation can be activated and fulfilled at the group level
(i.e., through one’s group memberships). ODT argues that within any context, an optimally
distinct social identity exists. With regard to ones’ group memberships, optimally distinct social
identities are those identities that simultaneously balance one’s need for inclusion within a
valued group with one’s need for their valued group to be sufficiently differentiated from other
relevant groups. Indeed, much empirical evidence supports the premises of ODT (see
Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010 for a review).
Consider the example of a prejudice researcher attending the annual Association for
Psychological Science convention, which is comprised of researchers from many different
subfields within psychology. The social identity of ‘psychologist’ might be too inclusive, and
thus not be optimally distinct given the situation. Conversely, the social identity of a ‘prejudice
researcher’ might be too differentiated. However, the social identity of ‘social psychologist’
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would more likely be an optimally distinct social identity, in which the researcher’s inclusiveness
needs with a valued group (i.e., social psychologists) could be simultaneously balanced with the
researcher’s need to see their valued group as differentiated from other relevant groups (e.g.,
cognitive & personality psychologists).
The ODT framework can also be applied to better understand the interplay between
inclusiveness and differentiation needs at the individual level. Similar to optimally distinct social
identities, I argue that optimally distinct individual identities are those identities that
simultaneously balance one’s need for inclusion with others with one’s need for differentiation
from others. For example, regarding one’s individual interactions, consider the example of a
student (Keith) who transferred high schools and attended a new school in which everybody
tended to have different interests and family backgrounds than him. At first, this overly
differentiated identity would likely activate Keith’s need for inclusion with others. On the
contrary, consider the example of a student (Lane) at a high school in which everybody tended to
have the same interests and similar family backgrounds as himself. This overly inclusive identity
would likely activate Lane’s need to differentiate from others, or in other words, the need to be
seen as unique from others. In short, situations at the group (e.g., ‘psychologist’ at a major
conference) or individual (e.g.,, ‘Lane’s case’) level that activate differentiation needs cause one
to seek out social or individual identities that promote differentiation, or uniqueness from others,
whereas situations that activate inclusion needs at the group (e.g., ‘prejudice researcher’ at a
major conference) or individual (e.g., ‘Keith’s case’) level cause one to seek out social or
individual identities that promote inclusion with others.
The implications of using ODT as a framework to understand the opposing processes of
inclusion and differentiation at the individual level are fairly straightforward: A situation
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prompting an overly inclusive identity (Lane’s case) should activate a drive to fulfill
differentiation needs, and a situation prompting an overly differentiated identity (Keith’s case)
should activate a drive to fulfill inclusion needs. In short, situations at the group or individual
level that activate differentiation needs should cause one to seek out social or individual
identities that promote differentiation from other groups or individuals, whereas situations that
activate inclusion needs should cause one to seek out social or individual identities that promote
inclusion with other groups or individuals.
At the social identity level, previous research points to three strategies an individual can
use to reach a more balanced, optimally distinct social identity in situations in which inclusion
and differentiation needs are unbalanced. These strategies include changing one’s social identity
within the given context (Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993), altering one’s self-perceptions and
self-stereotypes regarding one’s ingroup memberships (e.g., Brewer & Pickett, 1999; Pickett,
Bonner, & Coleman, 2002; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997), and changing one’s perceptions
of ingroups and outgroups (Brewer, 1993; Pickett & Brewer, 2001; Pickett, Silver, & Brewer,
2002). Regarding the first strategy, Brewer et al. (1993) found that participants experimentally
assigned to overly inclusive group memberships (i.e., college student) countered by rating their
minimal group-created minority group (i.e., task underestimators) higher in positive social traits
than the majority outgroup (i.e., task overestimators). No such difference in positive social trait
ratings was found regarding minority or majority groups for those in a control condition.
Regarding the second strategy, as suggested by Turner and Onorato (1999), stereotyping
oneself in terms of an ingroup may simultaneously increase one’s sense of within group
inclusion and between group differentiation. Supporting this postulate using manipulations of
needs for inclusiveness and differentiation, as well as measures of self-stereotyping regarding
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ingroup traits, Pickett et al. (2002) uncovered that individuals with needs for either more
inclusive or differentiated social identities were more likely to self-endorse traits congruent with
ingroup stereotypes than individuals in a control condition.
Regarding the third strategy, Pickett and Brewer (2001) uncovered that in comparison to
those in a control group, participants in both need for inclusion and differentiation conditions had
increased perceptions of ingroup and outgroup homogeneity on a group similarity trait rating
task. Similar to the strategies employed regarding self-stereotyping discussed above, perceptions
of ingroup and outgroup homogeneity allowed individuals to assume a more inclusive
connection to their valued group, while at the same time maximizing group differentiation. These
strategies highlight the ways by which perceptions of the self and one’s ingroups and outgroups
can be shaped by individuals’ needs to achieve a more inclusive or differentiated social identity.
Collectively, these studies demonstrate that activation of needs for inclusiveness and
differentiation at the social identity level can lead individuals to fulfill these needs using the
strategies described above. The studies above verify the theoretical framework of ODT as an
opposing process model, as well as its utility in explaining cognitive alterations or changes in
one’s group memberships or representations as a function of motivated need states. Given these
findings, the utility of ODT’s central tenets as a framework to consider how needs for inclusion
and differentiation can be activated and fulfilled at the individual level appears to be a ripe area
for empirical inquiry. To my knowledge, no theories regarding needs for inclusion or
differentiation activated or fulfilled through one’s individual interactions have utilized an
opposing process model view of these mechanisms, as ODT has done. As Brewer (1991) argues,
a balance of these two basic needs for inclusion and differentiation in any given situation is
always the optimal state, and I aim to explore this possibility with regard to individually-
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activated needs to explore the validity of ODT in predicting needs for inclusion and
differentiation at the individual level of the self.
More importantly, however, I contend that ODT may be a valuable framework for
beginning to understand the bases of interethnic ideology endorsements. As stated earlier, only
two studies to my knowledge have investigated the bases of colorblind and multicultural
ideology. Furthermore, although Plaut et al. (2011) investigated the associations between
feelings of inclusion, feeling included in organizational diversity initiatives, colorblind ideology,
and multicultural ideology, they did not investigate how a need for differentiation may associate
with interethnic ideology endorsements. Brewer’s ODT (1991) provides the theoretical compass
to better understand how inclusiveness and differentiation needs may be both activated and
fulfilled through one’s individual identities. Moreover, using ODT as the guiding theory will
permit a more complete understanding of how inclusiveness and differentiation needs may be
activated as a result of one’s social context or situation.
Additionally, Plaut et al. (2011) did not experimentally examine whether a feeling of
inclusiveness predicted endorsement of colorblind or multicultural ideology. As such, causal
relationships between a feeling of inclusiveness or activation of inclusiveness needs with
colorblind ideology have not yet been demonstrated. Furthermore, Plaut et al. (2011) evaluated,
in part, how an individual’s need for belongingness might influence their interethnic ideological
endorsements. Need for belongingness, however, was conceptualized as a personality trait
variable that remained fairly consistent among individuals. This differs from ODT’s social
psychological conceptualization of a need for inclusiveness (or belongingness) as being activated
and fulfilled through one’s social identities and largely dependent on social context. By
conceptualizing of a need for inclusion (or belongingness) as an individual difference variable,
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one necessarily restricts investigation as to how one’s social situations and interactions may have
an important influence on the activation of need states and interethnic ideological endorsements.
As such, in the current study, I operationally define inclusiveness needs via ODT, in
which a need for inclusion has the propensity to be activated in all individuals, regardless of
trait-based need for belongingness levels. Although individuals high in a need for belongingness
may be particularly likely to construe of a particular situation as threatening to feelings of
inclusion, ODT argues that all individuals have the capability of having needs for inclusiveness
threatened as a function of one’s situations.
Consider the example of the student, Keith, discussed earlier, who had transferred high
schools and attended a new school in which students had different interests and came from
different family backgrounds than himself. Keith would likely feel overly differentiated from
others given this situation, which would in turn activate his need for inclusion. Consequently, he
may be apt to endorse colorblind ideology, and the notion that ‘we are all the same,’ as a means
to bring his needs for inclusion and differentiation back into balance. In contrast, consider the
example of Lane, a student at a high school in which everybody tended to have similar interests
and come from a similar background as himself. Lane would likely feel overly similar to others
given this situation, which would in turn activate his need for differentiation. Consequently, he
may be apt to endorse multicultural ideology, and the notion that differences between others
should be valued and respected, as a means by which to fulfill his activated need for
differentiation.
In short, I expect that individuals with inclusiveness needs activated may be more likely
to endorse colorblind ideology, whereas individuals with differentiation needs activated may be
more likely to endorse multicultural ideology. Just as previous research has indicated that
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individuals strategically alter their self- and group-perceptions to fulfill needs for more inclusive
or differentiated social identities, I expect that endorsement of these interethnic ideologies may
also be sufficient strategies by which to fulfill activated needs for inclusion or differentiation at
the individual level of interaction.
It is important to note that interethnic ideology endorsements are increasingly being
conceptualized as malleable as a function of situational concerns. For example, in her historical
review of color blindness and multiculturalism, Plaut (2010) hints at the malleability of
interethnic ideology, stating that the ‘history of color blindness …demonstrates the malleability
of models of diversity…the shifts of meanings of equality and equal protection over time
depending on social and political circumstances and goals’ (p. 86). This malleable
conceptualization of interethnic ideology is congruent with the hypotheses that interethnic
ideology may serve the function of fulfilling situationally-activated needs for inclusion and
differentiation. The proposed work is unique in that it examines the malleability of interethnic
ideology, as well as how basic motives for inclusion and differentiation may underlie
endorsements of colorblind and multicultural ideologies.
Motivated Perception
In addition to examining the need-based antecedents of interethnic ideology endorsement,
another goal of the current study is to assess the degree to which ODT-based needs influence
social perception of sameness or difference between individuals. Surprisingly, to my knowledge,
no research has examined the ODT-based needs-visual social perception relationship. Certainly,
the study of motivated need states on perception is not a novel area of psychological inquiry.
Motivated perception has its roots in the New Look movement of the 1940’s and 1950’s (Bruner,
1957; Bruner & Goodman, 1947). This movement was grounded in the premise that perception
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was more than just a strictly bottom-up, sensory-driven process, and that individuals were not
passive, helpless observers at the whims of regimented sensory processes and structures.
Research since Bruner’s (1957) work has demonstrated that individuals’ attitudes, beliefs,
emotions, motives, needs, and expectations can have a significant impact on social perception,
above and beyond that of bottom-up, rigid, sensory-driven processing (e.g., Balcetis & Dunning,
2006; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Fazio, Ledbetter, & Towles-Schwen, 2000; Fazio and Williams,
1986; Higgins & Bargh, 1987).
Higgins’s work (1996) suggests that individuals’ motivational orientations can
powerfully influence strategies for achieving desired goals. Higgins (1996) distinguishes
between two distinct types of regulatory focus central to strategies for achieving desired goals.
Promotion focus concerns an orientation focused on advancement and opportunity, whereas
prevention focus concerns the avoidance of loss. Prior research has found that these specific
types of regulatory fit have a powerful impact on perception (Navon, 1977). Not surprisingly, the
body of evidence suggests that these motivational orientations be most impactful at influencing
perception and behavior in ambiguous, as opposed to clearly-defined situations (Liberman,
Molden, Idson, & Higgins, 2001).
Thus, it is well-established that perception is an active process and malleable as a
function of individuals’ unique experiences. In addition, as proposed by ODT, perceptions of
groups are one mechanism through which one can fulfill needs for more inclusive or distinctive
social identities (Brewer, 1993; Pickett & Brewer, 2001; Pickett et al., 2002). However, no
research speaks to the effects of ODT-based needs on social perception of individuals. I expect
that motivated needs for inclusion and differentiation may influence the degree to which one
perceives more ‘sameness’ or ‘difference’ between other individuals, and that colorblind and
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multicultural ideologies may mediate these relationships, respectively. For example, consider a
context in which one feels an overly differentiated individual identity (i.e., Keith). Given that this
individual’s need for a more inclusive identity (as predicted by ODT) has been activated, he may
be more likely to endorse colorblind ideology, in which the notion of ‘we are all the same’ is
paramount, as opposed to multicultural ideology, to fulfill his activated need for inclusiveness.
This endorsement, in turn, may predispose him to visually perceive ‘sameness’ between others,
as opposed to difference. It is important to note that I expect this pattern of mediation to occur
specifically within contexts of ambiguous social perception. In situations of unambiguous social
perception, I expect activated need states and subsequent interethnic ideology endorsements to
have less of an impact on social perception (Higgins, 1996).
Contrastingly, I expect that in situations in which an individual has an overly inclusive
identity in which a need for differentiation is activated, one may be more likely to perceive
‘difference’ between others, and that multicultural ideology may mediate this relationship. For
example, consider a context in which one feels an overly inclusive identity (e.g., Lane). Given
that his need for a more differentiated identity (as predicted by ODT) has been activated, he may
be more likely to endorse multicultural ideology, in which the valuing of ‘differences’ between
others is paramount, as opposed to colorblind ideology, to fulfill his activated need for
differentiation. This endorsement, in turn, may predispose him to visually perceive ‘differences’
in others, as opposed to sameness. Again, it is important to note that I expect this pattern of
mediation to occur specifically within contexts of ambiguous social perception.
The present study extends previous work that has evaluated the relationships between
interethnic ideology and social perception (Ryan et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 2010) by evaluating
visual social perception. This distinction is important, as a visual social perception task will force
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participants to make more basic, online judgments, in comparison to the downstream social
judgments of group member variability revealed in the range estimation and trait percentage
tasks employed in previous research (i.e., Ryan et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 2010). An increased
understanding of how interethnic ideology may influence basic social perception is important, as
basic social perception is fundamental to further downstream cognitive processes, and may
importantly inform the process by which more basic cognitive processes are transmitted into
more downstream social perceptual outcomes and behaviors (DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009)
with regard to interethnic ideologies. Moreover, the current study expands upon previous
research (i.e. Ryan et al., 2007; 2010) by examining the effects of activated needs and interethnic
ideology endorsements on visual social perception of individuals, as opposed to groups.
Overview and Hypotheses
In the current study, I assessed the degree to which visual social perception of Whites and
Blacks was influenced by activated needs for inclusion and differentiation, as well as the
mediational roles of colorblind and multicultural ideology endorsements in these relationships.
To my knowledge, this is the first study that has evaluated the effects of situationally-activated
needs for inclusion and differentiation on endorsement of colorblind and multicultural
ideologies, and ultimately, visual social perception of individual group members.
I hypothesized that individuals with activated needs for more inclusive individual
identities would be more likely to endorse colorblind ideology, and to visually perceive sameness
between individual others. Furthermore, I hypothesized that individuals with activated needs for
more differentiated individual identities would be more likely to endorse multicultural ideology,
and to visually perceive difference between individual others.
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Pilot-tested morphed-faces judgment task
Developing a task in which perceptions of similarity and difference in others could be
assessed required pilot testing. As such, I amassed pairings of both White and Black individuals,
varying in similarity, for use in the primary study. First, a total of 32 faces of White (16) and
Black (16) individuals were collected. Then, faces of the same sex and ethnicity were matched
prior to creating face morphs. More specifically, eight pairings of the White faces (four female,
four male) and eight pairings of the Black faces (4 female, 4 male) were created. Next, a total of
fifteen morphs regarding each one of these face pairings were created using the computer
software program FantaMorph. Morphs were created at 25% intervals, with each interval of 25%
indicating a difference of 25% between face 1 and face 2 in a particular pairing. For instance,
consider a face pairing regarding 2 faces. When these faces were completely distinct and
unmorphed, they are denoted as 0% vs. 100%. However, when the faces involved in a pairing
were identical and unmorphed, they were denoted, for example as 0% vs. 0%, 25% vs. 25%,
50% vs. 50%, 75% vs. 75%, and 100% vs. 100%. Differences of 25% between face pairings
(e.g., 25% vs. 50%) indicated that pairings were very similar, but slightly different from each
other. As percentage differences increased in pairings (to 50% & 75%), differences between
faces became increasingly distinct.
I created morphed face pairings of the following degrees regarding each face pairing: 0%
vs. 0%, 0% vs. 25%, 0% vs. 50%, 0% vs. 75%, 0 % vs. 100%, 25% vs. 25%, 25% vs. 50%, 25%
vs. 75%, 25% vs. 100%, 50% vs. 50%, 50% vs. 75%, 50% vs. 100%, 75% vs. 75%, 75% vs.
100%, 100% vs. 100%. In sum, regarding each of the sixteen face pairings, participants viewed 5
trials (80 total trials) in which faces were exactly the same, four trials (64 total trials) in which
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there was a 25% difference (i.e., faces were very similar but slightly different), three trials (48
total trials) in which there was a 50% difference (i.e., faces were somewhat similar but also
somewhat different), 2 face pairings (32 total trials) in which there was a 75% difference (i.e.,
faces were slightly similar but quite different), and one face pairing (16 total trials) in which the
faces were unmorphed and completely different (i.e., 100% difference).
The goal of pilot testing was to verify that sufficient variability in participants’ (n=10)
categorizing of faces as the same or different existed. This was crucial, as variability in sameness
and difference judgments was essential to properly testing hypotheses as to whether or not need
state activation influenced ideological endorsements and visual perception. Within the pilot
study, participants were shown the aforementioned 16 face pairings (fifteen trials of varying
similarity each) as described above. Each participant rated a total of 240 face pairings on whether
or not the faces in each presented trial were ‘exactly the same’ or different. Each face pairing
was presented using the computer software program MediaLab. In all face pairing trials, two
faces of the same race (i.e., White or Black) and sex were simultaneously shown on a black
computer screen. Faces were approximately 4 inches in height by 3 inches in width. Participants
were asked to respond as quickly but as accurately as possible in categorizing the faces as
‘exactly the same’ (pushing the ‘A’ key) or ‘different’ (pushing the ‘L’ key). The presentation
order of the morphed faces was completely randomized.
In total, four face pairings consisted of White males, four consisted of White females,
four consisted of Black males, and four consisted of Black females. Regarding the four white
male pairings, participants made 367 ‘exactly the same’ (61.2%), compared to 233 ‘different’
judgments (38.8%). Regarding the four White female pairings, participants made 337 ‘exactly
the same’ (56.2%), compared to 263 ‘different’ judgments (43.8%). Regarding the four Black
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male pairings, participants made 302 ‘exactly the same’ (50.3%), compared to 298 ‘different’
judgments 49.7%). Regarding the four Black female pairings, participants made 353 ‘exactly the
same’ (58.8%) and 247 ‘different’ judgments (41.2%). In averaging across race, participants
made 704 ‘exactly the same’ (58.67%) judgments and 496 ‘different’ (41.33%) judgments
regarding White pairings. In comparison, participants made 655 ‘exactly the same’ (54.58%)
judgments and 545 ‘different’ (45.42%) judgments regarding Black pairings. Thus, there seemed
to be little difference in perceptions of ‘exactly the same’ and ‘different’ as a function of pairing
race.
Furthermore, there appeared to be sufficient variability within face pairings regarding
how many ‘exactly the same’ and ‘different’ judgments were made. For instance, on the 25%
different interval morph types, participants made 454 ‘exactly the same’ judgments (70.9%) and
186 ‘different’ judgments (29.1%). On the 50% different morph types, participants made 114
‘exactly the same’ judgments (23.8%) and 366 ‘different’ judgments (76.3%). On the 75%
different morph types, participants made 275 ‘exactly the same’ judgments (14.1%) and 45
‘different’ judgments (85.9%). On the 100% (completely different) morph types, participants
made 11 ‘exactly the same’ judgments (6.9%) and 149 ‘different’ face judgments (93.1%).
Finally, on the 0% (exactly the same) morph types, participants made 735 ‘exactly the same’
face judgments (91.9%) and 65 ‘different’ judgments (8.1%). Overall, individuals made 1,359
‘exactly the same’ judgments (56.6%) and 1,041 ‘different’ judgments (43.4%). Thus, in
aggregating across all trial types, it appears as if the frequency of ‘exactly the same’ and
‘different’ judgments is relatively close to being evenly distributed. Even more telling is the fact
that the most variability (i.e., judgment percentages closer to 50%) in ‘exactly the same’ and
‘different’ judgments existed on the more ambiguous morph pairings (i.e., 25% and 50%
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different morph trials). These morph types consisted of faces that were very close to being
‘exactly the same,’ but not quite identical. When aggregating across these trial types, participants
made 568 ‘exactly the same’ judgments (51%) and 552 ‘different’ judgments (49%). Thus, it
appears as if aggregating across the 25% and 50% morph types regarding judgments of sameness
and difference may allow the most variability in judgments. This pilot data and its implications
are important, given that I expect that activation of differentiation and inclusiveness needs will
be most impactful in influencing visual perceptions in ambiguous situations (i.e., 25% and 50%
morph trials).
Chapter 2: Method
Participants
A laboratory experiment employing a between-subjects design was utilized. A total of
238 White (172 female, 66 male), introduction to psychology students from the University of
Tennessee participated in group experimental sessions. Participants received credit toward
fulfilling an Introduction to Psychology class requirement for their participation.
Procedure
Prior to arrival to the laboratory for their primary experimental session, participants
completed several online measures relevant to primary hypotheses. Specifically, participants
completed an 8-item measure of social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius,
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), an eight-item measure of racial identity adapted from Sellers,
Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, and Smith’s (1997)’s multidimensional inventory of Black identity
(MIBI), a twenty-five item measure assessing self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974), a three-item
measure of conservatism (Pratto et al., 1994), a ten-item measure of need for belongingness
(Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2012), and a demographic questionnaire which assessed
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participants’ race and sex. Upon arrival to the laboratory for their group sessions, participants
were assigned to one of the three need-state activation conditions: need for differentiation
activation, need for inclusion activation, or control. Participants completed all subsequent
experimental measures on laboratory computers.
Participants all first completed a personality inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Those in
the need for inclusion and differentiation activation conditions received false feedback indicating
that they scored extremely similar to (need for differentiation activation condition) or different
from (need for inclusion activation condition) other students. Participants in the control condition
received no feedback as to their personality score (described in more detail below).
Following the manipulation, participants completed a 20-item endorsement of colorblind
ideology measure (Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Brown, 2000), as well as a 4-item endorsement
of colorblind ideology and 4-item endorsement of multicultural ideology measure (Ryan et al.,
2007). To assess visual perception of individuals, participants completed the pilot-tested
morphed-faces judgment task in which they reported whether pairs of faces were either exactly
the same or different. The order in which participants completed the interethnic ideology scales
and morphed-faces judgment task was counterbalanced.1 Following completion of the interethnic
ideology measures and morphed-faces judgment task, participants completed a manipulation
check question regarding their current feelings of inclusion with and differentiation from others,
as well as an open response item assessing their feelings about the experiment in general.
Materials
Social dominance orientation (SDO). Prior to arriving to the library for their primary
group experimental session, participants completed several online questionnaire measures. First,
participants completed eight items assessing SDO from Pratto et al.’s (1994) original sixteen
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item scale. Participants indicated their level of positivity or negativity toward such questions as
‘Inferior groups should stay in their place’ and ‘Group equality should be our ideal’ (reversescored) using a 1 (very negative) to 8 (very positive) response range. These items have been used
in abundant psychological research (e.g., Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Siers, 1997; Thomsen,
Green, & Sidanius, 2008) and demonstrated excellent psychometric properties. In the current
study, α = .82.
Racial identity. Next, participants completed the 8-item centrality subscale of Sellers et
al.’s (1997) multidimensional inventory of Black identity (MIBI). The scale items were adapted
and generalized to measure racial identity (as opposed to specifically Black identity).
Participants indicated the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with statements such as
‘Overall, my race has very little to do with how I feel about myself’ (reverse-scored) and ‘My
race is an important reflection of who I am’ using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)
response range. The centrality subscale of the MIBI has been used extensively in previous
research (e.g., Olson, Crawford, & Devlin, 2009) and demonstrated excellent psychometric
properties. In the current study, α = .82.
Self-monitoring. Participants next completed Snyder’s (1974) 25-item measure of selfmonitoring. Participants indicated the degree to which several statements, such as ‘I’m not
always the person I appear to be’ and ‘I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different
people in different situations’ (reverse-coded) were true of them using a 1 (extremely untrue of
me) to 7 (extremely true of me) response range. These items have been used frequently in
previous research (e.g., Snyder, Berscheid, & Glick, 1985) and demonstrated excellent
psychometric properties. In the current study, α = .73.
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Conservatism. Next, participants provided their views on foreign policy issues, social
issues, and economic issues using a 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative) response range.
Their responses were averaged together to form a measure of conservatism. These items have
been used in several other studies (e.g., Zabel, Christopher, Marek, Wieth, & Carlson, 2009) and
demonstrated excellent levels of reliability. In the current study, α = .86.
Need for belongingness. Participants next completed Leary et al.’s (2012) 10-item
measure assessing need for belongingness. Participants indicated the degree to which they agreed
with a series of ten statements, such as ‘My feelings are easily hurt when I feel that others do not
accept me’ and ‘I want other people to accept me’ using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree) response range. In the current study, α = .80. Following completion of the need for
belongingness scale items, I collected demographic information on participants’ race and sex.
Need for differentiation activation. Upon arrival to the laboratory for group
experimental sessions, participants first completed Costa and McCrae’s (1992) 60-item NEO-FFI
of Big Five personality factors. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three need state
activation conditions: need for differentiation activation, need for inclusion activation, or control.
The two experimental need state activation conditions (i.e., need for differentiation activation
and need for inclusion activation) utilized false feedback on the personality inventory.
Specifically, participants in the need for differentiation activation condition learned that their
score on the personality inventory was 302, and that the average score of students completing the
inventory was 309. Furthermore, the prompt ‘Your personality is extremely similar to other
students who have taken this test’ appeared next to participants’ scores. I expected this paragraph
to activate individuals’ need for differentiation from others.
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Need for inclusion activation. Participants in the need for inclusion activation condition
learned that their personality inventory score was 252, and that the average score of students
completing the inventory was 309. Furthermore, the prompt ‘Your personality is extremely
different from other students who have taken this test’ appeared next to participants’ score. I
expected this paragraph to activate individuals’ need for inclusion with others.
Control. In the control condition, participants completed the same personality inventory
as individuals in the need for differentiation and need for inclusion activation conditions.
However, these participants received no feedback as to their score, and proceeded directly to the
next phase of the experiment following completion of the inventory.
Endorsement of colorblind ideology. Endorsement of colorblind ideology was assessed
with two measures. First, Neville et al.’s (2000) 20-item (CoBRAS) scale was utilized.
Participants indicated the degree to which they disagreed or agreed with such statements as
‘Immigrants should try to fit into the culture and values of the US’ and ‘Racial and ethnic
minorities do not have the same opportunities as white people in the US’ (reverse-coded) using a
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) response range. This measure has been used in
numerous studies and has displayed excellent validity and reliability (e.g., Burkard & Knox,
2004). In the current study, α = .79. Frequently, this measure consists of three smaller factors,
which include racial privilege, institutional discrimination, and blatant racial issues. The racial
privilege factor consists of blindness as to the existence of White privilege, the institutional
discrimination factor consists of a limited awareness as to the implications of institutional forms
of racial discrimination, and the blatant racial issues factor consists of unawareness as to the
pervasiveness of racial discrimination. In the current study, racial privilege, institutional
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discrimination, and blatant racial attitudes consisted of reliabilities of .70, .62, and .72,
respectively.
In addition to Neville et al.’s (2000) scale, I employed Ryan et al.’s (2007) four-item
scale to assess endorsement of colorblind ideology. Participants indicated the degree to which
each of four statements were important to improving intergroup relations, such as ‘Recognizing
that all people are basically the same regardless of their ethnicity’ using a 1 (not important at all
to improving intergroup relations) to 7 (extremely important to improving intergroup relations)
response range. In the current study, α = .60.
Endorsement of multicultural ideology. Similarly, endorsement of multicultural
ideology was assessed using Ryan et al.’s (2007) four-item scale. Participants indicated the
degree to which each of four statements were important to improving intergroup relations (e.g.,
‘Emphasizing the importance of appreciating group differences between ethnic groups’) using a
1 (not important at all to improving intergroup relations) to 7 (extremely important to improving
intergroup relations) response range. In the current study, α = .68.
Morphed faces judgment task.
Participants completed the pilot-tested morphed faces judgment task, in which they rated
a total of 240 face pairings on whether or not the faces in each presented trial were either
‘exactly the same’ or ‘different.’ In all face pairing trials, two faces of the same race (i.e., White,
Black) and sex were simultaneously shown on a black computer screen. One face was shown on
the left side, and the other the right side of the screen. Participants were asked to respond as
quickly but as accurately as possible in categorizing the faces as ‘exactly the same’ or ‘different’.
Participants were instructed to push the ‘A’ key on the computer if the faces were ‘exactly the
same,’ and to push the ‘L’ key if the faces were ‘different.’ The presentation order of the
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morphed faces was completely randomized. Response latencies, as well as participants’
judgments (i.e., ‘exactly the same’ or ‘different’) and whether or not their judgments were
correct were recorded for each of the 240 morph trial pairings.
Manipulation check. Following completion of the interethnic ideology measures and
morphed-faces judgment task, participants were asked to ‘Please rate the degree to which you
feel different from or similar to others at this moment’ using a 1 (extremely different from others)
to 7 (extremely similar to others) response range. Additionally, participants were provided an
open response question, in which they described their general feelings about the experiment,
whether or not they believed their personality score was indicative of their actual personality,
and any other pertinent information they wished to tell the primary experimenter. Following
completion of these items, participants were debriefed and thanked for their time.
Chapter 3: Results
Data Preparation: Morphed Faces Judgment Task
Each participant had 240 lines of initial data regarding the morphed faces judgment task,
each of which consisted of 16 pairings of Black individuals and 16 pairings of White individuals.
Each of four of the pairings consisted of two White males, each of four pairings consisted of two
White females, each of four pairings consisted of two Black males, and each of four pairings
consisted of two Black females. For purposes of clarity, and given the pilot data results, I
aggregated across pairing race. For each of the sixteen pairings, participants made similarity
judgments on 15 morphed versions of each pairing. Five of the versions were exactly the same
(0%), four versions were almost exactly the same but slightly different (25%), three versions
were moderately similar but also moderately different (50%), two versions were somewhat
similar but quite different (75%), and one version was completely different (100%). Thus, each
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of the 238 participants made a total of 240 similarity judgments (57,120 total aggregate cases).
For each trial, participants’ trial responses (i.e., ‘exactly the same’ or ‘different’) and response
latencies were recorded. Consistent with previous research on implicit attitudes and quick
judgments (Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998),
response latencies less than 300 ms. (n = 68, .001% of trials) and greater than 3000 ms. (n = 279,
.005% of trials) were deleted prior to data aggregation. This left a total of 56,773 aggregate
cases, with a mean response latency of 1,052.87 ms. (SD = 371.30 ms.). Participants made
‘different’ judgments on 22,356 of these trials (39.38%), whereas they made ‘exactly the same’
judgments on 34,417 of these trials (60.62%). Overall, participants correctly identified 38,780 of
trials (68.31%), and incorrectly identified 17,993 of these trials (31.69%).
As shown in Figure 1, regarding the five ranges of similarity between individual morph
pairings, participants correctly identified 0% (exactly the same) morphed pair trials 92.92% of
the time. Regarding 25% different morphed pair trials (slightly different but very similar),
participants correctly identified such morphed pair trials as ‘different’ 24.07% of the time.
Regarding 50% different morphed pair trials (moderately similar but also moderately different),
participants correctly identified such morphed pair trials as ‘different’ 67.80% of the time.
Regarding 75% different morphed pair trials (somewhat similar but quite different), participants
correctly identified such morphed pair trials as ‘different’ 83.38% of the time. Finally, regarding
100% morphed pair trials (completely different face pairings), participants correctly identified
such morphed pair trials 87.34% of the time. These descriptive statistics indicate, as in the pilot
study, that the greatest variability in ‘exactly the same’ and ‘different judgments’ existed within
the 25% different and 50% different morph trials. When aggregating across these two trial types,
participants accurately identified these morphs as ‘different’ 42.81% of the time. These
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descriptive statistics provide preliminary evidence that the greatest variability in ‘exactly the
same’ and ‘different’ judgments may exist when aggregating across 25% and 50% faces morphs.
As demonstrated in Figure 2, regarding response latencies for each of the varying degrees
of similarity judgments, participants took an average of 985.47 ms. (SD = 163.56 ms.) to make
judgments on exactly the same morph trials, an average of 1,111.28 ms. (SD = 193.16 ms.) to
make judgments on 25% different morph trials, an average of 1,123.26 ms. (SD = 163.48 ms.) to
make judgments on 50% different morph trials, an average of 1,031.64 ms. (SD = 142.34 ms.) to
make judgments on 75% different morph trials, and an average of 995.24 ms. (SD = 147.86 ms.)
to make judgments on completely different morph trials. These response latencies demonstrate
that individuals took longer to make judgments on the 25% different and 50% different morphed
face trial types, in comparison to the other three trial types. Indeed, although the difference in
reaction times between 25% different and 50% different morphed face trial types was not
significant, t (237) = -1.57, p = .12, there were significant differences between the 25% different
and 50% different trial types with regard to each of the exactly the same, 75% different, and
completely different morphed trial types (all t’s > 8.77, p < .001). These differences in response
latencies suggest that the 25% different and 50% different morphed trial types were the most
ambiguous of all morph trial types.
As demonstrated in Figure 3, regarding response latencies for trials in which participants
were correct, participants took an average of 978.13 ms. (SD = 159.33 ms.) to make judgments
on exactly the same morph trials, an average of 1,292.64 ms. (SD = 242.76 ms.) to make
judgments on 25% different morph trials, an average of 1,172.97 ms. (SD = 165.51 ms.) to make
judgments on 50% different morph trials, an average of 1,044.88 ms. (SD = 140.20 ms.) to make
judgments on 75% different morph trials, and an average of 999.66 ms. (SD = 147.40 ms.) to
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make judgments on completely different morph trials. Thus, regarding trial types in general, as
well as trial types that participants were correct, individuals took longer to make judgments
within the 25% different and 50% different morphed face trial types, in comparison to the other
three trial types. Indeed, t-tests indicated significant differences between the 25% and 50% trial
types with regard to each of the exactly the same, 75% different, and completely different trial
types (all t’s > 18.05, p < .001), such that individuals took longer to correctly identify pairings in
the 25% different and 50% different morphed trial types than in the 75% different, completely
different, or exactly the same morphed trial types. It is important to note that although the
reaction time means of the 25% different and 50% different morphed trial types were
significantly different from each of the aforementioned morph types, they were also significantly
different from one another, t (237) = 9.55, p < .001.
Given that the greatest variability in perceptions of faces being ‘exactly the same’ or
‘different’ appear to exist within the 25% different and 50% different morph trial types, I created
two new variables by summing participants’ correctly identified ‘different’ judgments on these
two trial types (‘exactly the same’ = 0, ‘different’ =1), as well as computing the mean response
latencies on 25% different and 50% different trial types correctly identified by participants.
Need State Manipulations
I next inspected the manipulation check to verify that participants in the need for
inclusion activation condition indicated feeling less similar to others, in comparison to those in
the need for differentiation activation condition. Supporting the utility of the need state
manipulation, an independent samples t-test verified that participants in the need for inclusion
activation condition reported feeling less similar to others (M = 3.33, SD = 1.45) than
participants in the need for differentiation activation condition (M = 4.14, SD = 1.34), t (161) =
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3.75, p < .001. There was no difference in feelings of similarity between participants in the need
for differentiation activation condition or participants in the control condition (M = 4.20, SD =
1.23), t (156) = -.27, p = .79. However, the difference in feelings of similarity between
participants in the need for inclusion activation and control conditions was significant, t (153) = 4.04, p < .001, such that participants in the need for inclusion activation condition felt less
similar to others than those in the control condition.
In further exploring the data, a few trends that suggested that the control condition was
not an appropriate comparison for the two experimental conditions’ emerged. First, participants
in the control condition were significantly faster (M = 1,010.04, SD = 138.67) to make judgments
of ‘exactly the same’ or ‘different,’ regardless of morph type, in comparison to those in the need
for inclusion activation condition (M = 1,085.06, SD = 137.15), t (153) = 3.02, p = .003. This
tendency for control condition participants to be quicker in social perception, regardless of trial
type, was congruent in comparison to participants in the need for differentiation activation
condition (M = 1,043.30, SD = 148.33), albeit not significantly, t (156) = 1.10, p = .27. The
difference in response latencies between the need for differentiation and need for inclusion
activation conditions was marginally significant, and in the direction consistent with hypotheses,
such that individuals in the need for inclusion activation condition took longer to make social
judgments in general among all morph types, t (161) = -1.86, p = .06. These patterns indicate that
in general, participants in the control condition were quicker to make social judgments than
either participants in the need for inclusion activation or need for differentiation activation
conditions.
I next examined correct responses across all conditions. I found that participants in the
control condition (M = 158.40, SD = 1.97) provided significantly fewer correct social judgments
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than those participants in the need for differentiation activation condition (M = 163.80, SD =
17.14), t (156) = 1.98, p < .05, as well as those participants in the need for inclusion activation
condition (M = 166.31, SD = 19.98), t (153) = 2.64, p = .009. No significant difference in the
sum of correct social judgments was found between those participants in the need for
differentiation activation and need for inclusion activation conditions, t (161) = -.86, p = .39. The
fact that control condition participants had higher error rates than experimental need state
activation participants was troubling, and suggested that perhaps control participants differed
from experimental condition participants in characteristics that might prohibit inclusion of
control condition participants from this study, especially given the criticalness of the morphed
faces judgment task.
In terms of individual difference variables, a t-test indicated that participants in the
control condition (M = 3.89, SD = .66) were lower in self-monitoring than participants in the
need for differentiation activation condition (M = 4.19, SD = .62), t (156) = 2.94, p = .004, as
well as those participants in the need for inclusion activation condition (M = 4.04, SD = .66),
albeit not significantly, t (153) = 1.40, p = .16. The differences in self-monitoring between the
need for differentiation activation and need for inclusion activation conditions was not
significant, t (161) = 1.48, p = .14. This reduced self-monitoring of control condition
participants, in comparison to need for differentiation activation and need for inclusion activation
condition participants, is important for a few reasons. First, previous research (Rubin & Henzl,
1984) has indicated a positive relationship between self-monitoring and cognitive complexity,
which itself has been positively-linked to enhanced perception of nonverbal behaviors
(Uhlemann, Lee, & Hasse, 1989) in individuals. Cognitive complexity in general has been
related to enhanced social perception and perceptual discrimination skills (Burleson & Caplan,
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1998). This research suggests that a predisposition to be low in self-monitoring among control
condition participants may influence the degree to which individuals are able to attend to the
subtle differences regarding similarity and differences within the face perception task. The
elevated error rates and reaction time latencies among control condition participants, relative to
need state activation participants were congruent with this intuition.
As such, in all subsequent analyses, I disregarded the control condition, and directly
compared solely the need for differentiation (coded = 0) and need for inclusion activation (coded
as 1) conditions in predicting endorsement of colorblind and multicultural ideology, and
ultimately, visual perception of others. It is important here to note that t-tests indicated no
significant differences in SDO, racial identity, self-monitoring, conservatism, or need for
belongingness regarding online questionnaire measures (all p’s > .14) between need for
differentiation and need for inclusion activation participants.
Need State Activation and Interethnic Ideology
First, I investigated the degree to which the need state activation experimental
manipulation predicted endorsement of colorblind and multicultural ideologies. Three t-tests
were conducted, with the need state manipulation (0 = need for differentiation activation
condition, 1 = need for inclusion activation condition) entered as the grouping variable and
participants’ mean scores on Ryan et al.’s (2007) 4-item endorsement of colorblind and
multicultural ideologies, as well as Neville et al.’s (2000) 20-item measure of colorblind
ideology entered as the test variables.
The first t-test indicated, as hypothesized, significant mean differences in colorblind
ideology using Ryan et al.’s 4-item measure as a function of experimental condition, t (158) = 2.06, p = .04, such that participants in the need for inclusion activation condition endorsed
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colorblind ideology (M = 6.27, SD = .68) to a greater extent than those in the need for
differentiation activation condition (M = 5.98, SD = 1.02). This finding is congruent with the
hypothesis that when made to feel different from others, individuals’ need for inclusion is
activated, causing them to endorse colorblind ideology and the notion that ‘we should all be
treated the same’ to a greater extent. It is important here to note that none of the individual
differences variables (i.e., SDO, racial identity, need for belongingness, conservatism, selfmonitoring) interacted with need state activation condition in predicting colorblind ideology (all
p’s > .16).
No significant differences emerged regarding Neville et al.’s (2000) 20-item scale of
colorblind ideology between individuals in the need for differentiation activation condition (M =
4.11, SD = .75) or need for inclusion activation condition (M = 4.03, SD = .69), t (158) = .75, p =
.45.2 However, one individual difference variable (i.e., conservatism) did interact with need state
activation condition in predicting endorsement of Neville et al.’s (2000) measure of colorblind
ideology, t (159) = -1.99, p < .05. The nature of the interaction was such that the discrepancy in
colorblind ideology endorsement among highly conservative (M = 4.52) and low conservative
(M = 3.62) individuals in the need for differentiation activation condition was greater than
among highly conservative (M = 4.28) and low conservative (M = 3.80) individuals in the need
for inclusion activation condition. Although I was unsure as to the interpretation of this
interaction, it was not crucial to the current study’s aims, especially given there were no
significant differences in Neville’s et al.’s (2000) measure of colorblindness as a function of
need state activation condition. Given the lack of utility in the need state activation manipulation
on Neville et al.’s (2000) measure of colorblind ideology, I dropped this measure from all
subsequent analyses.

34
Regarding multicultural ideology (Ryan et al., 2007), a t-test indicated no significant
differences between participants in the need for differentiation activation (M = 5.67, SD = 1.08)
and need for inclusion activation (M = 5.87, SD = .84) conditions, t (158) = -1.23, p = .22.
Moreover, none of the individuals differences variables (i.e., SDO, racial identity, need for
belongingness, conservatism, self-monitoring) interacted with need state activation condition in
predicting multicultural ideology (all p’s > .13). I had expected that individuals in the need for
differentiation activation condition would be more likely to endorse multicultural ideology.
However, no support exists with regard to this hypothesis. As such, I dropped multicultural
ideology as a chief variable of interest, and focused on the effect of need state activation
condition on endorsement of colorblind ideology (Ryan et al., 2007), as well as visual perception
of others. Having established that individuals with a need for inclusion activated were more
likely to endorse colorblind ideology than those with a need for differentiation activated, I next
set out to examine the effects of the need state activation on visual perception.
Need State Activation and Visual Perception.
I next conducted a series of t-tests to investigate the effect of the need state manipulation
on visual perceptions of ‘exactly the same’ and ‘different’ in others. Again, I expected the need
state manipulation to effect visual perception on ambiguous morph trial types (i.e., 25% different
and 50% different) more so than less ambiguous trial types (i.e., 75% different, completely
different, & exactly the same morphs). For sake of thoroughness, I first ran a series of t-tests to
investigate mean differences between the need for differentiation activation and need for
inclusion activation conditions in predicting perceptions of ‘exactly the same.’ I expected that
individuals in the need for inclusion activation condition would make more ‘exactly the same’
judgments on ambiguous trial types (i.e., 25% different and 50% different morph types) than

35
individuals in the need for differentiation activation condition. Surprisingly, no significant
differences in ‘exactly the same’ judgments between participants in need for differentiation
activation and need for inclusion activation conditions were found regarding 25% different
morph trials, t (161) = 1.00, p = .32, 50% different morph trials, t (161) = .44, p = .66, 75%
different morph trials, t (161) = -.18, p = .86, completely different morph trials, t (161) = 1.17, p
= .24, or exactly the same morph trials, t (161) = -.71, p = .48.
I next investigated correct trial responses for each of the five morph trial types (i.e., 25%,
50%, 75%, 100%, and 0%). To code for correct trial responses, correct responses to individual
trials were coded with a 1 (incorrect responses coded a 0). Then, individual trial responses that
were correct were summed for each morph trial type, with higher numbers reflecting a greater
amount of correct responses. I expected that individuals in the need for inclusion activation
condition would correctly identify ambiguous trial types (i.e., 25% different and 50% different)
to a lesser extent than individuals in the need for differentiation activation condition.
Surprisingly, no significant differences in correct responses between participants in need for
differentiation activation and need for inclusion activation conditions were found regarding 25%
different morph trials, t (161) = -.95, p = .35, 50% different morph trials, t (161) = -.24, p = .81,
75% different morph trials, t (161) = .02, p = .98, completely different morph trials, t (161) = 1.10, p = .27, or exactly the same morph trials, t (161) = -.71, p = .48.
I next ran a series of t-tests regarding individuals’ response latencies to morph trials as a
function need state activation and each of the five morph trial types (i.e., 25% different, 50%
different, 75% different, completely different, & exactly the same). I expected that it would take
need for inclusion activation condition participants longer to correctly identify face pairings as
‘different’ than need for differentiation activation participants, especially when the face pairings
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were ambiguous (i.e., 25% different and 50% different morph trial types). As expected, on the
most ambiguous trials (i.e., 25% different morph types), participants in the need for inclusion
activation (M = 1,364.01, SD = 250.15) condition were slower to correctly identify faces as
‘different’ than participants in the need for differentiation (M = 1,274.64, SD = 236.72)
activation condition, t (161) = -2.34, p = .02.
There was no difference between need for differentiation activation (M = 1,162.43, SD =
155.80) and need for inclusion activation (M = 1,195.70, SD = 166.22) conditions regarding
correct 50% different trial response latencies, t (161) = -1.32, p = .19, although the trend was in
the expected direction. Unexpectedly, regarding response latencies for completely different trial
types, those in the need for differentiation activation (M = 978.05, SD = 133.33) condition were
quicker to correctly identify individuals as ‘different’ than those in the need for inclusion
activation (M = 1,040.23, SD = 164.92) condition, t (161) = -2.65, p = .009. There were no
significant differences in response latencies for correct trials between individuals in need for
differentiation activation or need for inclusion activation conditions regarding 75% different
morph types, t (161) = -1.49, p = .14, as well as exactly the same morph types, t (161) = -1.82, p
= .07.3
Given that the 25% and 50% morph trial types consisted of the greatest variability in
‘exactly the same’ and ‘different’ judgments, I aggregated these trial types and computed an
average response latency for correct trials regarding these trial types. A t-test indicated that
participants in the need for inclusion activation condition (M = 1,279.85, SD = 187.47) took
longer to correctly identify ambiguously different trials (i.e., mean response latency of 25%
different and 50% different trial types) than participants in the need for differentiation activation
condition (M = 1,218.53, SD = 182.93), t (161) = -2.11, p = .04.4 Again, this finding is consistent
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with the hypothesis that activation of a need to feel included with others impedes the speed with
which one is correctly able to perceive ‘difference’ in others. The appropriate judgment of
‘different’ directly opposes participants’ activated need, and hence causes response conflict.
Previous analyses indicated that need state activation condition significantly predicted
endorsement of colorblind ideology, such that individuals in the need for inclusion activation
condition endorsed colorblind ideology more than individuals in the need for differentiation
activation condition. Thus, it is entirely possible that colorblind ideology may be driving the
tendency for individuals with activated needs for inclusion to be slower to correctly categorize
ambiguously different faces as such than individuals with activated needs for differentiation. As
such, I utilized the correct response latencies for ambiguously different trials (i.e., mean response
latencies of 25% different and 50% different morph types) as the chief criterion variable in
reported subsequent analyses.
It is important here to note that another interpretation is that activation of one’s need for
differentiation may be causing endorsement of multicultural ideology, leading to quicker correct
categorization of ambiguously different faces as being ‘different’ (compared to individuals with
a need for inclusion activated). However, the lack of a significant difference between need state
activation conditions in predicting multicultural ideology minimizes the likelihood of this
alternative interpretation. Furthermore, a regression analysis with multicultural ideology entered
as the predictor variable and correct response latencies of ambiguously different faces entered as
the criterion revealed no significant differences in endorsement of multicultural ideology, t (161)
= 1.54, p = .13, B = .12
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Testing Mediational Hypotheses
In order to establish that colorblind ideology mediated the relationship between need state
activation condition and response latencies of ambiguously different faces in the current study, I
needed to demonstrate the following four sets of relationships: 1) the need state activation
manipulation significantly predicted correct response latencies of ambiguously different face
pairings; 2) the need state activation manipulation significantly predicted colorblind ideology
endorsement; 3) colorblind ideology significantly predicted correct response latencies of
ambiguously different face pairings; 4) the predictive ability of the need state activation
manipulation in correct response latencies of ambiguously different face pairings was
significantly reduced when controlling for colorblind ideology. Given that results already
indicated that need state activation condition significantly predicted colorblind ideology (2) and
correct response latencies of ambiguously different face pairings (1), confirming the mediational
hypothesis concerning need state activation, colorblind ideology, and visual perception appeared
promising.
Two hierarchical regressions were utilized to further examine the mediational ability of
colorblind ideology in minimizing the predictive strength of need state activation condition in
correct response latencies of ambiguously different face pairings. In the first regression, I entered
colorblind ideology (Ryan et al., 2007) as the criterion. In the first step of the regression, I
entered need state activation condition. In the second regression, I entered correct response
latencies of ambiguously different face pairings as the criterion. In the first step of the second
regression, I entered need state activation condition. In step 2, I entered need state activation
condition and colorblind ideology. The first regression analysis revealed that need state
activation condition was a significant positive predictor of colorblind ideology, t (161) = 2.09, p
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= .038, β = .16. Specifically, individuals in the need for inclusion activation condition (M = 6.27,
SD = 5.98) endorsed colorblind ideology more so than individuals in the need for differentiation
activation condition (M = 5.99, SD = 1.02)
The second regression analysis revealed that colorblind ideology (while controlling for
need state activation condition on step 1 of the regression) was a significant positive predictor
regarding correct response latencies of ambiguously different faces5, t (160) = 2.25, p = .026, β =
.18. Thus, as colorblind ideology increased, individuals tended to take longer to correctly
identify ambiguously different faces as ‘different,’ likely because of response conflict between
their colorblind ideology ideological endorsement and the ambiguously different face primes.
Furthermore, supporting mediational hypotheses, the initial significant predictive ability of need
state activation condition in correct response latencies of ambiguously different faces, t (161) =
2.11, p = .036, β= .16 was reduced to below statistical significance, t (160) = 1.74, p = .083, β =
.14) after controlling for the predictive ability of colorblind ideology.
Mediational Role of Colorblind Ideology
Having identified that need state activation condition predicted response latencies of
ambiguously different faces, as well as evidence supporting the mediating role of colorblind
ideology in this relationship, I next used bootstrapping procedures (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to
simultaneously examine the mediational abilities of colorblind and multicultural ideology in the
need state activation- correct response latencies of ambiguously different faces relationship.
Bootstrapping allows simultaneous testing of two mediators of a relationship between a predictor
and criterion variable, and in this case, testing as to whether the reduction in predictive ability of
need state activation condition in correct response latencies of ambiguously different faces was
significantly reduced when controlling for the effect of colorblind ideology. Bootstrapping is
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especially well-suited to this study’s aims, as I want to affirm that colorblind ideology (and not
multicultural ideology) mediated the predictive strength of need state activation condition in
response latencies of ambiguously different faces. I used an SPSS Macro (available for download
at quantpsy.org) that Preacher and Hayes (2008) created to conduct all bootstrapping procedures.
Using the SPSS Macro, I conducted a multiple regression analysis, utilizing ordinary
least squared regression and bias-corrected bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2008), to further
investigate the strength of need state activation condition in predicting correct response latencies
of ambiguously different faces and the potential mediating roles of colorblind and multicultural
ideology in diminishing these predictive strengths. In the regression, colorblind and and
multicultural ideology were entered as the mediational variables, need state activation condition
as the predictor variable, and correct response latencies of ambiguously different faces entered as
the criterion variable. Moreover, 5,000 boot iterations and 95% confidence intervals were
specified. Indirect bootstrap estimates (BEs), as well as lower and upper 95% confidence
intervals were computed for colorblind and multicultural ideology to assess their mediational
effects in the relationships between the predictor variable (i.e., need state activation condition)
and the criterion variable (i.e., correct response latencies on ambiguously different trials). Lower
and upper confidence interval ranges not containing 0 indicated a significant mediational effect
pertaining to the tested relationship at a 95% confidence interval.
Bias-corrected confidence intervals indicated that, as expected, colorblind ideology (LCI =
.69, UCI = 27.39) fully mediated the predictive strength of need state activation condition in
correct response latencies of ambiguously different faces (see Figure 4), whereas multicultural
ideology (LCI = -4.40, UCI = 15.58) did not. That is, controlling for the effects of colorblind
ideology in predicting correct response latencies for ambiguously different faces significantly
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reduced the predictive ability of need state activation condition in predicting correct response
latencies on ambiguously different faces. The predictive ability of need state activation condition
was reduced so much, that after controlling for colorblind ideology, need state activation
condition was no longer a significant predictor of correct response latencies for ambiguously
different faces. These findings are congruent with the hypothesis that an activation of a need to
feel more included with others caused individuals to endorse colorblind ideology (more so than
individuals with differentiation needs activated), which in turn was positively predicted response
latencies in which individuals were able to correctly identify ambiguously different faces.
It is important to note that I also directly compared the need for inclusion activation
condition participants to the control condition participants by computing a new need state
activation condition coded variable (control = 0, need for inclusion activation condition = 1). A ttest indicated that those in the need for inclusion activation condition (M = 6.27, SD = .67)
endorsed colorblind ideology more than individuals in the control condition (M = 5.82, SD =
1.02), t (153) = -3.28, p = .001. I next computed a regression with correct response latencies for
ambiguously different trials entered as the criterion variable, the new need state activation
condition coded variable entered on step 1 as a predictor, and both need state activation condition
and colorblind ideology simultaneously entered in step 2 as predictors. The regression revealed a
significant main effect of need state activation condition, t (153) = 2.81, p = .006, B = .22, such
that individuals in the need for inclusion activation (M = 1,279, SD = 187.47) condition were
slower to appropriately categorize ambiguously different faces than participants in the control
condition (M = 1,198.40, SD = 172.95). This regression also revealed that when controlling for
the effects of need state activation condition, colorblind ideology was a significant positive
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predictor of correct response latencies for ambiguously different trials, t (152) = 2.42, p = .017, B
= .19
These results were consistent with mediation, in that those in the need for inclusion
activation condition were more likely to endorse colorblind ideology (compared to those in the
control condition), and in turn slower to categorize ambiguously different faces as such (due to
response conflict). Moreover, when controlling for the effects of colorblind ideology, the degree
to which need state activation condition predicted correct response latencies of ambiguously
different faces was reduced, t (152) = 2.13, p = .034, B = .17, but still statistically significant. To
examine if the amount of variability accounted for in correct response latencies on ambiguously
different trials was significantly reduced when controlling for colorblind ideology, I again
utilized bootstrapping procedures (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).
In a regression, colorblind and multicultural ideology were entered as the mediational
variables, need state activation condition (recoded as control = 0, need for inclusion activation
=1) as the predictor variable, and correct response latencies of ambiguously different faces
entered as the criterion variable. Moreover, 5,000 boot iterations and 95% confidence intervals
were specified. Indirect bootstrap estimates (BEs), as well as lower and upper 95% confidence
intervals were computed for colorblind and multicultural ideology to assess their mediational
effects in the relationships between the predictor variable (i.e., need state activation condition)
and the criterion variable (i.e., correct response latencies on ambiguously different trials).
Bias-corrected confidence intervals indicated that, as expected, colorblind ideology (LCI =
4.11, UCI = 38.05) attenuated the predictive strength of need state activation condition in correct
response latencies of ambiguously different faces (see Figure 5), whereas multicultural ideology
(LCI = -11.71, UCI = 5.98) did not. That is, controlling for the effects of colorblind ideology in
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predicting correct response latencies for ambiguously different faces significantly reduced the
predictive ability of need state activation condition in predicting correct response latencies for
ambiguously different faces. However, the predictive ability of need state activation condition
after controlling for colorblind ideology was not reduced below statistical significance. Overall,
this line of results is consistent with hypotheses, in that activation of inclusiveness needs caused
individuals to endorse colorblind ideology more so than individuals with differentiation needs
activated (and control participants with no needs activated), which in turn triggered response
conflict and slower correct classification of ambiguously different faces.
Chapter 4: Discussion
My first objective in the current research was to examine the predictive ability of need
state activations of inclusion and differentiation on endorsements of colorblind and multicultural
ideology. As expected, endorsement of colorblind ideology was a viable strategy for individuals
to use in order to fulfill an activated need for inclusiveness. Surprisingly, however, endorsement
of multicultural ideology was not utilized by individuals to fulfill activated differentiation needs.
My second objective in the current research was to examine the predictive ability of
colorblind and multicultural ideology in perceptions of sameness and difference in others.
Colorblind ideology endorsement positively predicted longer response time latencies regarding
‘different’ judgments on ambiguously different morphed faces, whereas multicultural ideology
did not. Surprisingly, neither colorblind nor multicultural ideology predicted the number of
‘different’ judgments made by participants on ambiguously different morph trials.
The third objective in the current research was to investigate the effect of need state
activation condition on number and response latency of ‘different’ judgments made by
participants on ambiguously different morph trials. Individuals in the need for inclusion
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activation condition took longer to accurately categorize ambiguously different morph trials than
individuals in the need for differentiation activation condition. However, need state activation
condition did not predict the number of ‘different’ judgments on ambiguously different trials. In
sum, need state activation condition and colorblind ideology endorsement were significant
predictors of correct response latencies regarding ambiguously different trials, but not actual
judgments of difference.
The fourth objective in the current research was to investigate the degree to which
activated needs for inclusiveness and differentiation influenced endorsement of colorblind and
multicultural ideologies, as well as their effects on response latencies to correctly identify,
ambiguously different morph trials. Using bootstrapping procedures (Preacher & Hayes, 2008), it
was revealed that colorblind ideology fully mediated the predictive ability of need state
activation condition regarding longer reaction times in correctly identifying ambiguously
different faces. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that endorsement of colorblind
ideology is a viable strategy with which to fulfill activated needs for inclusion, and that
endorsement of colorblind ideology holds implications for social perception. Specifically, greater
endorsement of colorblind ideology predicted longer response times to correctly categorize
ambiguously different faces. It is important to note that although inclusiveness needs also
predicted longer response times to correctly categorize completely different faces, colorblind
ideology was not functional in mediating this relationship. Thus, as expected, it appears as if
colorblind ideology endorsement’s mediational effect on the need state activation-social
perception reaction time relationship is most functional in ambiguous forms of perception.
It is uncertain why need state activation condition did not significantly predict
multicultural ideology endorsement. Specifically, although I expected individuals in the
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differentiation activation condition to endorse multicultural ideology to a greater extent than
those in the need for inclusion activation condition, no support for this hypothesis was found.
One interesting aspect of the results is that need for differentiation activation participants did not
differ from control condition participants regarding feelings of similarity, although both groups
differed significantly from need for inclusion activation participants (need for inclusiveness
activation condition participants felt much less similar due to the manipulation). This pattern
suggests that the need for inclusiveness activation manipulation was successful, whereas the
need for differentiation activation manipulation may not have been successful (at least in
activating differentiation needs significantly more than control participants).
One explanation for the lack of a manipulation effect on multicultural ideology
endorsement exists in differences within the operational definitions of multicultural and
colorblind ideology. Colorblind ideology consists of the set of beliefs that ‘we are all the same.’
Inherent in the ‘we’ part of this definition is the self. That is, the self is directly implicated within
colorblind ideology endorsement. Implication of the self, in turn, perhaps enhances the degree to
which need state activations occurring at the individual level (i.e., need for inclusion activation)
can be fulfilled via colorblind ideology endorsement. Because colorblind ideology includes a
sense of sameness between oneself and others, I expect it’s an especially potent means by which
to fulfill activated needs for inclusion. In contrast, multicultural ideology consists of the set of
beliefs that ethnic group differences should be acknowledged, valued, and appreciated. Less
inherent within multicultural ideology is how the self relates to others, or more specific to ODTactivated needs, how the self is unique and different from others. Because multicultural ideology
is more focused on acknowledging differences between others and not the important combination
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of perceiving differences between oneself and others (analogous to colorblind ideology), it may
not be a potent means by which to fulfill activated needs for differentiation.
Additionally, it is unclear as to why no significant findings were revealed with regard to
need state activation condition predicting actual ‘different’ judgments. Perhaps these trends
provide evidence that superseding the effects of need for inclusion activation involves a two-step
process: 1) grasping that ambiguously different faces are not ‘exactly the same’; and 2)
appropriately categorizing the faces as ‘different.’ However, for need for differentiation
activation condition participants, perception may only involve a one-step process. These
participants were seeking out differences, and thus speed of appropriately categorizing
ambiguously different faces was enhanced. The findings indicate that participants did not differ
in their ability to accurately perceive ambiguously different faces as a function of need state
activation condition, but that response conflict did influence response latencies to these trials.
Specifically, response conflict existed regarding need for inclusion activation participants
because their activated need to feel included with others and hence to perceive ‘sameness’
conflicted with the correct response on ambiguously different trials (i.e., ‘different’). However,
need for differentiation activation participants experienced no response conflict on ambiguously
different trials, given that their activated needed to feel differentiated with others and hence
perceive ‘difference’ did not conflict with the correct response on ambiguously different trials.
Nevertheless, the findings are congruent Ryan et al.’s work (2007) regarding interethnic
ideological endorsements, group stereotypes, and ethnocentrism. Along with colorblind and
multicultural ideology scales, Ryan et al. (2007) employed measures in which participants rated
the percentage of Blacks and Whites that possessed a variety of stereotypic and
counterstereotypic traits, as well as a range estimation task in which participants indicated the
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highest and lowest Blacks and Whites would fall on each trait. From participants’ range
estimation responses, the authors created a perceived dispersion estimate. Ryan et al. (2007)
found that as White participants’ colorblind ideology scores increased, their perceptions of
variability within groups regarding traits across both Blacks and Whites tended to decrease. That
is, as Whites’ colorblind ideology scores increased, they tended to perceive Blacks to be more
similar to one another, as well as Whites to be more similar to one another. The current study’s
findings are congruent in that as colorblind ideology scores increased, individuals tended to have
slower reaction time latencies in correctly categorizing ambiguously different faces. As
elaborated earlier, this slower reaction time latency is likely due to the response conflict between
colorblind ideology beliefs (i.e., ‘we should all be treated the same’) and correct responses on
ambiguously different trials (i.e., ‘different’).
The present study extends previous work that has evaluated the relationships between
interethnic ideology and social perception (Ryan et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 2010) by evaluating
visual, more basic social perception, in comparison to the downstream social judgments revealed
in the range estimation and trait percentage tasks employed in previous research (i.e., Ryan et al.,
2007; Ryan et al., 2010). More basic, online judgments are driven by early cognitive perceptual
processes, such as attention, and stem from automatic processes. An increased understanding of
how interethnic ideology may influence basic social perception may importantly inform the
process by which more basic cognitive processes are transmitted into more downstream social
perceptual outcomes and behaviors (DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009) with regard to interethnic
ideologies. Nevertheless, the current study’s findings regarding the colorblind ideology-social
perception link are congruent with and buttress Ryan et al.’s (2007; 2010) findings.
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In a similar vein, it may also be beneficial to investigate other, more downstream forms
of social perception, such as perceived measures of trait variability to others (Ryan et al., 2007),
and see if the patterns described in the current study are replicated. It is important to verify that
the results of the current study can be replicated not only in facial perception, but other forms of
social perception more broadly. Face perception is chiefly a uniquely human capability of which
individuals are extremely capable. We immediately perceive emotions and make inferences
about others based on their facial characteristics. In regards to perceiving others, the face is an
especially important feature in which individuals interpret the emotions, mood, and goals of an
interaction partner. In short, individuals are finely attuned to distinguishing differences between
faces. This point in general may also help explain the lack of significant differences in actual
perceptions of ‘different’ as a function need state activation condition. Therefore, it may be
useful to evaluate the effects of need state activation on means of more basic perception less
central to processes as fundamental as face perception. Nevertheless, that we found effect of
need for inclusion activation and influences of colorblind ideology on a highly refined form of
basic social perception such as face perception speaks to the promise of the confirmed
mediational model in other forms of social perception.
In addition to other forms of social perception, future research should investigate the
effects of need state activation on interethnic ideology endorsement and social perception using
converging methods. Furthermore, in contrast to the individual-level manipulation of need state
activation in the current study, future research may benefit from looking at the effects of groupbased manipulations of need for inclusiveness or need for differentiation. Indeed, Brewer’s
(1991) optimal distinctiveness theory is based in the tenet that individuals’ group memberships
are powerful agents of basic needs for inclusion and differentiation. Past research (Pickett,
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Silver, & Brewer, 2002) has investigated the effects of need activation at the group level on
group-level outcomes (e.g., perceptions of ingroup size and inclusiveness). Pickett et al. (2002)
utilized false feedback in a similar manner as in the current study to manipulate needs for
inclusiveness and differentiation at the group level. In future research, I hope to use converging
group- and individual-level manipulations to better understand the effects that need state
activation at both the individual and group level of analysis may hold on individual-level
interethnic ideology endorsement and social perception.
It is important to note that the correlational nature of the relationship between colorblind
ideology and correct response latencies of ambiguously different trials necessarily limits causal
conclusions. However, the link of the significant mediational model concerning colorblind
ideology endorsement and correct response latencies of ambiguously different trials is the only
link of which causal conclusions cannot be inferred. Future research should manipulate
endorsement of colorblind and multicultural ideology and investigate whether or not colorblind
ideology causes changes in correct response latencies of ambiguously different trials. Colorblind
and multicultural ideologies have been successfully manipulated in previous research (e.g.,
Wolsko et al., 2000) through use of essays espousing colorblind- or multicultural-based
messages, and such methods would prove invaluable to strengthening the evidence for colorblind
ideology’s role as a mediator in the need for inclusion activation-social perception relationship.
Such evidence would add support for the current study’s mediational model, and suggest that
need for inclusion activation causes increases in colorblind ideology, which in turn causes
increases in correct response latencies of ambiguously different trials.
Additionally, the lack of a viable control group in the current study necessarily limits
comparisons to solely need for inclusion activation and need for differentiation activation
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conditions. Thus, for example, I can surely conclude from the current study’s findings that need
for inclusion activation predicts greater endorsement of colorblind ideology, relative to need for
differentiation activation. Of course, it would be ideal to directly compare need for inclusion and
differentiation activation participants to participants with no needs activated with regard to
ideological endorsements and social perception. Nevertheless, the current study’s findings
provide important theoretical contributions by integrating theory involving situationally-based
motives, interethnic ideology endorsement, and social perception. Moreover, as highlighted in
the results, the mediational model in which need for inclusion activation (relative to need for
differentiation activation) predicted colorblind ideology, which in turn predicted longer correct
response latencies on ambiguously different trials also held true when directly comparing need to
inclusion activation participants to control participants. Thus, it appears as if need for inclusion
activation predicts greater endorsement of colorblind ideology, relative to need for differentiation
and control conditions, which in turn influences correct response latencies of ambiguously
different trials. However, given the concerns with the control condition data previously discussed
and in the interest of maintaining appropriate comparisons between need activation conditions, I
for the most part abstained from comparing experimental need state conditions to the control
condition in the current study.
One particular strength of the current study is that moderational analyses confirmed that
individual differences variables (i.e., SDO, need for belongingness, self-monitoring, racial
identity, conservatism) did not interact with the experimental need state activation conditions in
predicting colorblind ideology, nor did they interact with colorblind ideology in predicting
increased correct response latencies on ambiguously different trials. These findings suggest that
regardless of trait levels of need for belongingness, situational activations of a need for
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inclusiveness predicted endorsement of colorblind ideology and increased response latencies of
ambiguously different trials, in comparison to need for differentiation activation. The current
study’s findings extend Plaut et al.’s (2011) by demonstrating that situationally-activated needs
for inclusion (as compared to individual difference-based measures of need for belongingness)
can significantly influence support for colorblind ideology and colorblind ideological
endorsement.
The results of the current study support the malleability of interethnic ideology
endorsements (specifically colorblind ideology) as a function of situationally-based motives. To
my knowledge, only one other study (Knowles et al., 2009) has investigated the utility of
situational variables in predicting ideological endorsements. The current study is unique in that it
examined situational-based motives, and their effects on ideological endorsements. Because
interethnic ideologies have been valuably implicated with intergroup interaction aspects that hold
important ramifications for whether or not such interactions lead to friendship development or
conflict, examination of both the individual difference- and situationally-based variables that
might predispose one to endorse these ideologies is of utmost importance. The current study
provides further evidence as to the malleability of interethnic ideologies as a function of
situationally-based motives, as well as effects those ideological endorsements may in turn have
on basic social perception processes.
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Appendix
1. No order effects regarding need for differentiation and need for inclusion activation
effects on colorblind or multicultural ideology, as well as difference judgments and
response latencies of ‘different’ judgments on ambiguously different trials (all p’s > .12)
were detected.
2. There were no differences in Neville et al.’s (2000) three subscales of racial privilege,
institutional discrimination, and blatant racial issues regarding individuals in the need for
differentiation activation and need for inclusion activation conditions (all p’s > .49).
3. Five t-tests assessing response latencies on incorrect trials regarding 25%, 50%, 75%,
100%, and 0% morphed trial types indicated no significant differences in response
latencies between participants in the need for differentiation activation or need for
inclusion activation conditions (all p’s > .09).
4. It is important to note that no individual difference variables (i.e., SDO, racial identity,
need for belongingness, conservatism, or self-monitoring) interacted with need state
activation to predict mean correct response latency for ambiguously different trials (i.e.,
25% & 50% morph trials; all p’s > .09).
5. A regression with correct response latencies regarding completely different trials types
entered as the criterion, the need activation condition entered on step 1, and both need
activation condition and colorblind ideology entered on step 2 was conducted to
investigate the potential mediating role of colorblind ideology in the need state
activation-correct response latencies on completely different trials relationship. The
results indicated no significant predictive ability of colorblind ideology in correct
response latencies on completely different trials, t (160) = .78, p = .44, B = .06.
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Figure 1. Percentage of correct responses as a function of morph trial type.
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Figure 2. Reaction time as a function of morph trial type.
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Figure 3. Reaction time of correct responses as a function of morph trial type.
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Figure 4. Effects of need state activation (Need for differentiation vs. inclusion) on correct
response latencies and the mediational role of colorblind ideology.
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Figure 5. Effects of need state activation (Control vs. Need for inclusion) on correct
response latencies and the mediational role of colorblind ideology.
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